Alright, lets respond to this one. I'll start out by saying I'm not an expert but I do know a bit on this topic. I've spent several hours at the Sudanese Embassy in Beijing doing interviews for research on Sino-Sudanese Relations...
Overall, I respect what HRW is trying to do, and I don't necessarily disagree with it. I want the violence in Sudan to stop as much as the next person who can point to Sudan on a map on their first try. It is simply that they are writing the letter without thinking about who they are writing it to.
Like Brad Adams' 4 requests/suggestions (although its more like 5, because he also wants China to write an overview on Sino-Sudanese policy over the last 10 years.. that's a request... one that's not likely to happen...) I have a few points in response. Somehow, while reading this letter I found 6 points to raise that show that this letter will either be thrown away by public security or laughed at at the next Politburo meeting.
1) Outside Force Telling China What To Do
China don't play that. You are an outsider, a 老外, someone who isn't from Chinese (or an American born Chinese for that matter). You are also not a powerful government that can coerce them into submission (even the States aren't seen as that powerful... even though they are seen as the opposite power...). You are an NGO. In China's still highly hierarchical society, you aren't nothing but you definitely aren't something big. Therefore you cannot tell those at the top what to do. You can try to petition, but they can ignore you.
2) Suggesting Sanctions For Humanitarian Problems.
If you want to scare the CCP, yes, start screaming this at the top of your lungs. China's emphasis on Human Rights is and always has been (since they signed the UNDHR) collective rights over that of the individual. It won't change any time soon. Why is it this collective rights idea over that of individuals? The Chinese State's very legitimacy and power rests on this. It claims to act as the collective 'Chinese People' and therefore is (in one view) a legitimate state. If one were to start putting sanctions on states that have instances of human rights abuses... China is afraid that it could be used against its own state some day.
I believe this collective emphasis goes hand in hand with the Chinese state's emphasis on state sovereignty. Both policies seem to only be enacted to provide enough leeway so that, in the event of an emergency China can do what it pleases and claim it is a) in the interest of the collective to keep insurgencies down and b) that it is their sovereign right to do what they need in the name of their people.
I think China now simply supports these policies throughout the world (when it doesn't conflict with a more important policy) to use as examples if the case ever comes up. "We massacred people?! No we didnt, we quelled a dangerous rebellion. It is our sovereign right in the name of our people for a Harmonious Society! We have supported this in other countries (they wave from the background).
3)Oil Revenue? Telling Sudan Where It Goes?
This goes along with previous sentiment. China doesn't want someone telling them where to put their money. Neither would Sudan. (and somehow in telling Sudan, it would open the door to someone telling China).
4) China not Exporting Weapons. Yes, That's Right China Does Have That Policy. The PLA Doesn't.
China as a nation doesnt export weapons. China's Military does. That is a bit weird... but although they are technically both under the CCP, there isnt complete control, or in order to get a semblance of control some people who are used to getting some money off the side (see late 80's to late 90's.. I suggest Princes and Princesses of Red China... It will tell you what I'm saying) still do that job. The Military, as I have heard, does operate many 'illegal' operations. The governmental involvement on the whole, I would say, is minimal.
5)Examining Oil Development and Human Rights Abuses Won't Happen. Especially With the Trend of Oil Companies Frequently Operating in Areas of High Abuses.
The way that was phrased almost says: "Look at how you are operating in Sudan, Please. We think you may be responsible for some of it." A statement that (I would wager) the Chinese Government doesn't want attached to it.
6)No white paper or overview will come. They dont know where they are, so we can't.
The Chinese government, when it comes to Foreign Policy, is a collection of indecision and inaction. When a decision must be made for the safety of the state or prestige of the state, it is made. But, if it is not mandatory, and there are differing voices within the government, there will be no action, at least not in the near future.
On a side note the HRW website, for the moment is not blocked (emphasis on moment... I just checked and their site was up, which surprised me).
http://allafrica.com/stories/200701290203.html
Letter to China On the Crisis in Darfur
Human Rights Watch
(Washington, DC)
PRESS RELEASE
January 29, 2007
Posted to the web January 29, 2007
Washington, DC
President Hu Jintao
Zhongnanhai, Xichengqu, Beijing,
People's Republic of China
January 29, 2007
Dear President Hu:
We write regarding your upcoming trip to Sudan. China recently took
positive steps to encourage the Government of Sudan to accept a United
Nations peacekeeping force in Darfur. Yet consistent with China's
international obligations, its aspirations to be seen as a responsible
international power, and its claims to be a friend of the Sudanese
people, there is a great deal more your government can do on Sudan.
As you know, the situation in Sudan's Darfur region remains a human
rights and humanitarian disaster and has worsened considerably in the
course of 2006. At least 200,000 people have died and more than two
million civilians have been displaced by systematic violence in the
context of the internal conflict. Aid workers are increasingly under
attack, threatening the precarious lifeline of humanitarian assistance
which currently supports at least 3.5 million people. The Darfur
conflict has already entangled its neighbors, with at least 100,000
Chadian civilians displaced in 2006 by militia attacks emanating both
from Darfur and from spiraling inter-communal violence influenced by
Darfur's armed actors.
Despite numerous ceasefire agreements, the May 2006 peace accord,
and unilateral commitments to end militia recruitment and
indiscriminate aerial bombardment, the Sudanese government continues to
support ethnic-based attacks on civilians as a method of warfare in
violation of international humanitarian law. As recently as January
2007, international observers documented aerial attacks on civilians in
North Darfur, and Human Rights Watch research indicates that in spite
of all the evidence of massive atrocities committed by its "Janjaweed"
militia, the Sudanese government resumed recruitment of new militia
forces in late 2006.
The Sudanese government has made no substantive effort to end the
impunity of those individuals responsible for the crimes in Darfur and
continues to delay and obstruct international support to protect Darfur
civilians. These policies can only prolong and exacerbate the misery of
people in Darfur and neighboring countries. We enclose several of our
recent reports on the situation in Sudan and Chad, and were encouraged
to learn recently that our work on Sudan has been of use to several
officials at the Chinese Mission to the United Nations.
We believe that there are four steps China can take to improve the situation in Sudan.
First, seriously consider the important step of supporting through
the UN the imposition of targeted sanctions on key Sudanese officials
responsible for Darfur policy. Such sanctions should include freezing
of assets and travel restrictions and should be applied to the Sudanese
Minister of Defence and other high-level officials at a minimum. China
has recently publicly supported sanctions against Iran and imposed
lesser restrictions on North Korea for their nuclear activities. The
crisis in Sudan is no less critical, either for its victims in Darfur
or for the millions of civilians living in the region who now face
threats to their lives and livelihoods because of the regional
instability caused by Darfur's conflict. Millions of civilians face
this nightmare because of the Sudanese government's policies of
supporting abusive armed groups both within Sudan and across Sudan's
borders. China can demonstrate its support for regional peace and
security by publicly calling for an end to abusive domestic and foreign
policies.
Second, encourage the Government of Sudan to place a portion of its
oil revenues in an internationally administered trust fund for the
victims of atrocities. It is clear that the vast majority of Sudan's
oil revenues are not benefiting the millions of Sudanese citizens who
require basic services and even international food aid to survive. In
Darfur alone, at least 3.5 million are partly or wholly dependent on
international aid. At least two million people lost family members,
homes and all their assets at the hands of government forces and their
militias. Supporting a trust fund will not jeopardize China's energy
interests or cause unemployment in Sudan and will demonstrate China's
support for the victims of the conflict.
Third, it is imperative that China establish new mechanisms to
monitor the end-use of its weapons. Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
officials in London recently told Human Rights Watch that China has "a
policy of not exporting arms to conflict areas we only provide arms to
legitimate governments, only for self-defense, and the transfer should
be conducive to national and regional stability." Yet Human Rights
Watch research has documented the presence and use of Chinese arms by
the Sudanese government, the Janjaweed militia, Chadian rebels, and
Darfur rebels. In order for your policies to be meaningful, you must
immediately assert greater control of the export-either through
bilateral agreements or through private Chinese arms traders-of
weapons.
Fourth, China should examine the connection between Sudanese oil
development and human rights abuses. Human Rights Watch remains
extremely concerned by a number of practices in Sudan's oil sector,
including forced displacement of rural communities living in oil-rich
areas, often through targeted aerial and ground attacks by Sudanese
armed forces, and the environmental impact of oil exploitation in
southern and southeastern Sudan. Chinese oil companies have frequently
been operating in areas where communities complain of a wide range of
abuses.
Finally, we encourage you to issue an overview or white paper on
China's policies toward the Sudan over the past decade. Surely you will
agree that there is much international confusion regarding China's own
actions. It is in everyone's interests, including China's, to have a
clear sense of what initiatives China has undertaken.
Undertaking these steps will help demonstrate that China's interest
in Sudan is not merely about ensuring its access to oil supplies but
also about the welfare of the Sudanese people so devastated by the
ongoing conflict. Moreover, it will serve as an important signal to the
international community that China takes seriously its obligations to
uphold human rights.
Brad Adams
Executive Director
Asia Division
Peter Takirambudde
Executive Director
Africa Division
